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Household Debt and Consumer Spending in Korea:  
Evidence from Household Data† 
By YOUNG IL KIM AND MIN HWANG* 
Household debt in Korea raises concerns about the resilience of the 
economy due to its size and quality. Against this backdrop, we 
investigate if household leverage matters for private consumption in 
adverse economic environments even without severe financial 
disruptions. We find that the balance sheet positions in terms of the 
leverage ratio may weaken consumption growth. We also find that the 
depressive effect of debt on consumption may differ across types of 
consumer spending and household characteristics. In particular, the 
effects of indebtedness have been much stronger in relation to durable 
goods expenditures than in other areas. In addition, debtors in high-
income (wealth) groups have also shown downward adjustments in 
consumption even more so than low-income (wealth) groups. These 
findings imply that debtors’ precautionary behavior may serve as an 
important channel from leverage to consumer spending. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ousehold debt in Korea has raised concerns about economic resilience as the 
accumulated debt has been large relative to income (or GDP) when compared 
to many other countries. The Korean economy entered a deep recession at the onset 
of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and then slowed down again in 2011-13 
after a very short-lived recovery in 2010. Consumption growth was also very weak 
during the two periods of adverse macroeconomic conditions. It is often claimed 
that the high leverage of the household sector may drag down domestic demand, 
but without much empirical evidence. Against this backdrop, we investigate if
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household balance sheet positons have aggravated private consumption in the face 
of contractionary developments in the economy. 
Consumer spending may differ between households with high and low leverage, 
as high leverage may hinder households from increasing consumption 
expenditures, especially in times of adverse economic conditions. Highly leveraged 
households may show weaker consumption growth compared with other 
households because they may behave in a more precautionary manner out of   
fear of financial distress in the future or worry over limited access to credit. We  
ask in the current study how heterogeneity in household balance sheet positions  
in terms of leverage may explain the difference in the strength of consumer 
spending, especially under adverse macroeconomic conditions even with 
appropriately controlling for the common determinants of consumption, such as 
income, wealth and other relevant factors. In addition, we analyze various aspects 
of the debt-consumption relationship across different types of consumption and 
household characteristics for the two adverse economic environments in 2007-09 
and 2011-13. 
We find arguments in previous studies holding that household indebtedness 
matters with regard to consumer spending. Mishkin (1976, 1977, 1978) argues that 
the composition of household balance sheets influences the spending decisions of 
the household, especially on illiquid assets such as durable goods and house 
purchases. For example, household obligations such as a high debt burden would 
depress the demand for consumer durables even if the net worth remains constant. 
King (1994) argues that household indebtedness can destabilize the real economy 
by depressing aggregate consumption. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) also show 
that a large deleveraging shock may induce debtors to reduce consumption by a 
large amount while savers (or creditors) may not increase their consumption 
enough to compensate for the consumption decline by debtors under some 
circumstances. Betti et al. (2007) argue that too much debt accumulation based on 
erroneous beliefs about the future would result in adjustments in consumption 
expenditures if the beliefs or expectations about future incomes were shown to be 
false by actual outcomes.  
Based on the above theoretical arguments, we analyze at the household level 
how heterogeneity in the leverage of households or in their balance sheet 
compositions affects the consumption behavior, ceteris paribus, i.e., conditional on 
other common determinants of consumption. Consumption may be determined by 
income (Y), wealth (NW), and household characteristics according to previous 
studies. In addition to the common determinants, the analysis conducted here 
examines if household leverage can exert downward pressure on consumption 
expenditures in the event of adverse macroeconomic developments.   
We find that highly leveraged households tended to show weaker consumption 
growth compared with other households in the recession driven by the global 
financial crisis as well as in the recent economic slow-downs without much financial 
disruptions. In other words, weakness in the balance sheet position may exert 
downward pressure on household consumption in times of adverse macroeconomic 
conditions with high uncertainty about the future. In addition, we find that household 
leverage had much stronger effects on durable goods purchases than nondurable 
consumption, confirming based on a household-level analysis Mishkin’s (1976) 
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argument about the depressive effects of debt on consumer durables. We also find 
depressive effects of leverage on consumption in both low-income (wealth) and high-
income (wealth) households, with the effects even stronger in the latter group. This 
result suggests that debtors’ precautionary responses may have played an important 
role in their weak consumption growth amid the worsening economic conditions 
with uncertainty and looming associated economic prospects.1 In addition, we find 
that the effects of household leverage on consumption were greater in 2011-13 than 
in 2007-09. The weakness in consumption growth shown by leveraged households 
even in the less disruptive macroeconomic environment in more recent years (2011-
13) suggests that households’ balance sheet positions during these recent events may 
be more depressing with respect to private consumption. It is important to note that 
the rising share of highly leveraged households in combination with the depressive 
effect of leverage may exert greater downward pressure on private consumption if 
the economy is hit by severe shocks. From a policy perspective, the current study 
suggests that attention may be warranted with regard to the soundness of household 
balance sheets for the real economy, especially in times of worsening economic 
conditions. 
The current study is closely related to those by Dynan (2012), Andersen et al. 
(2014), and Son and Choi (2015) in that it undertakes an investigation of the debt-
consumption relationship based on household data with similar empirical methods. 
These earlier works all focus on the recessionary environment due to the global 
financial crisis (2007-09). In contrast, we show that leveraged households adjusted 
their spending not only during the deep recession driven by the global financial 
crisis (2007-09) but also during the decelerating economic environment in its 
aftermath (2011-13). In other words, the weak balance sheet positions of 
households may matter for the real economy during worsening economic 
environments even without severe disruptions in financial markets or 
intermediaries. We find that the effect of leverage on consumption growth was 
even stronger during the decelerating economic environment of 2011-13 than it 
was during the recession of 2007-09. In addition, we show how the depressive 
effect of household debt on consumption may differ across different types of 
consumer spending and household characteristics, as mentioned above. In 
particular, we find that household indebtedness has a stronger effect on consumer 
durables than on non-durables. In addition, the downward adjustment in 
consumption expenditures is strong even for high-income (wealth) households, 
suggesting that debtors’ precautionary behavior may serve as an important channel 
from leverage to consumer spending. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related 
studies, while section III describes the macroeconomic environment behind the 
current study as its motivational economic background. Section IV describes the 
data with relevant descriptive features used in the current empirical study, while 
section V discusses the empirical specifications. Section VI estimates the empirical 
specifications in the two periods (2007-09 and 2011-13) and discusses the results. 
Section VII ends with a summary and a discussion of related policy issues. 
 
1See Romer (1990), who argues that high uncertainty depressed private consumption during the Great 
Depression in the US.  
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II. Relationship with Previous Studies 
 
We can find theoretical arguments in literature that household indebtedness 
affects consumer spending. Mishkin (1976, 1977, 1978) suggested the illiquidity 
hypothesis, which holds that certain aspects of household balance sheets, such as 
liabilities, may influence households’ levels of demand for illiquid assets such as 
durable goods and houses. For example, changes in the composition of household 
balance sheets in terms of liabilities (or financial asset holdings) would affect the 
demand for consumer durables even if net worth remains constant. If households’ 
balance sheets deteriorate due to large household debt accumulation, consumer 
spending on illiquid items in particular would be severely depressed because more 
indebted households may fear financial distress in the future. King (1994) extends 
Fisher’s (1933) original debt deflation theory and shows based on a theoretical 
model that household indebtedness can destabilize the real economy. According to 
King (1994), debtors’ consumption functions may differ from those of creditors’ 
such that their aggregation may result in a state of unstable macroeconomic 
equilibrium, in which aggregate consumption can be somewhat depressed. He 
argues that debt deflation theory may help us to understand the economic declines 
experienced by northern European countries in the 1990s. Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012) also use debt-deflation theory to show based on a macroeconomic 
model with heterogeneity in household indebtedness taken into account that large 
deleveraging shocks can push the economy into much deeper recessions. 
Deleveraging shocks or a large decline in the desired level of leverage, due to 
uncertain income prospects for example, may induce debtors to reduce their 
consumption by a large amount, while savers (or creditors) may not increase their 
consumption enough to compensate for the consumption decline by debtors. Olney 
(1999) argues that the costs associated with defaults may result in large household 
spending cuts. Based on an empirical analysis of the relationship between defaults 
and consumer spending during the Great Depression, he concludes that the high 
costs of defaults forced households to make large spending cuts, especially in the 
face of uncertain income prospects. Hence, the difference in costs associated with 
consumer defaults may play an important role in consumer choice, especially in 
times of uncertain income prospects. Betti et al. (2007) link household over-
indebtedness to too much consumption spending that is not sustainable in the long 
run. For example, over-indebted households will adjust their consumption 
expenditures when their expectation of future income is adjusted or shown to be 
false by actual outcomes. In this sense, too much debt accumulation based on 
incorrect beliefs about the future may result in adjustments in future consumption 
expenditures.   
We may find empirical studies broadly related to the current study, which 
analyzes the relationship between household debt and the real economy in general. 
These previous studies conduct their analyses at various levels, from cross-country 
to household-level studies. Cross-country analyses of household debt and 
subsequent economic outcomes can be found in Bouis (2014), Jorda, Schularick, 
and Taylor (2013), Cecchetti et al. (2011), and Glick and Lansing (2010), among 
others. In addition to cross-country studies, there are cross-sectional analyses at the 
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state level or county level, as conducted by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), Mian and 
Sufi (2010), and Gartner (2013), among others. We can also find Glick and Lansing 
(2009) and Olney (1999), who base their analyses on macro-level data in the US. 
These empirical studies indicate that the rapid accumulation of too much debt tends 
to be followed by an economic downturn of various depths and protracted 
recoveries; hence, household debt likely influences economic activity.  
Close to the current study based on a household-level analysis but in a different 
empirical framework are Ogawa and Wan (2007) and Kim and Kim (2012). Ogawa 
and Wan (2007) study the debt-consumption relationship based on Japanese 
household data and argue that debt-asset ratios had negative effects on household 
consumption mainly through borrowing constraints when the bubble burst in the 
1990s. Kim and Kim (2012) analyze the time frame of 2000-07 from the Korea 
Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and argue that household debt 
accumulation increased consumption by relaxing credit constraints during the 
sample period.  
Studies fairly closely related to the present study with similar empirical 
frameworks were conducted by Dynan (2012), Andersen et al. (2014), and Son and 
Choi (2015). Dynan (2012) argues that the high leverage of households prior to the 
financial crisis may have weakened the recovery of consumption growth in the 
U.S. in the post-crisis years. Andersen et al. (2014) also study how the ex-ante 
level of household leverage may have affected the dramatic downturns in the 
Danish household sector in terms of the change in consumption expenditures in the 
post-crisis era. In line with these previous studies, Son and Choi (2015) analyze 
KLIPS data and argue that household leverage prior to the global financial crisis 
may be related to the downturns in consumption growth during the post-crisis 
years. In short, all of these studies analyze how the ex-ante leverage of households 
may be related to the ex-post recovery of consumption growth in the face of the 
deep recession during the global financial crisis of 2007-09. The current study 
complements earlier work by analyzing the impact of ex-ante household leverage 
on subsequent consumption behavior during the dramatic recession linked to the 
global financial crisis (2007-09) as well as the decelerating macroeconomic 
environment in recent years (2011-13). In addition, we shed light on other aspects 
of the debt-consumption relationship by analyzing different types of consumer 
spending and household characteristics. In terms of empirical specifications, we 
account for differences between debtors and non-debtors in terms of consumption 
behavior as well. 
 
III. Background Economic Conditions 
 
Household debt in Korea has increased relative to household income (or GDP) 
with only slight adjustments in 2007-08 and 2011-13 but without significant 
deleveraging processes, as shown in Figure 1, in contrast to countries that went 
through dramatic deleveraging phases amid the global financial crisis. The amount 
of household debt relative to income is high even compared to many other 
countries. The large accumulation of household debt relative to income suggests  
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FIGURE 1. AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD DEBT RELATIVE TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND GDP 
Source: Flow of Funds (1993 SNA, 2008 SNA) and National Accounts from the Bank of Korea.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. GDP AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION GROWTH RATES 
Source: National Accounts from the Bank of Korea. 
  
that the balance sheet positions of the household sector have weakened.2 Against 
this backdrop, household debt has often been cited as a contributing factor to the 
weak domestic demand after the global financial crisis, but without much evidence. 
During the global financial crisis, the Korean economy experienced a deep 
recession. Figure 2 shows that the real GDP growth rate dropped from 5.3% in 
2007 to 0.7% in 2009. Although the economy recorded a temporarily high GDP 
growth rate of 6.3% in 2010 immediately after the crisis, the real GDP growth rate 
dropped again to 2.3% in 2012, much lower than the average growth rate during 
the pre-crisis era. The weakening economic activity since 2010 as shown in Figure 
2 may be partly due to the weak recovery of the global economy given the 
European fiscal and financial turmoil with the high levels of uncertainty.  
We observe patterns in private consumption similar to that of GDP growth, as 
shown in Figure 2. Private consumption recorded a historically low real growth  
 
2See Kim, Lee, Son, and Son (2014), Kim and Yoo (2013), and Kim and Byun (2012) among others for 
detailed descriptions and assessments of household debt in Korea. 
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FIGURE 3. UNEMPLOYMENT (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED) AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY 
Note: The stock market volatility is the GARCH (1,1) standard deviation of the daily returns from the KOSPI 
index. 
Source: Statistics Korea, Korea Exchange. 
 
rate of 0.2% in 2009, a large drop from the rate of 5% in 2007. After a temporary 
sharp rise up to 4.3% in 2010, the real consumption growth rate declined again to 
1.9% in 2013 and has remained low in the subsequent years in comparison with the 
pre-crisis era. The weak consumption growth experienced by the household sector 
may also have put downward pressure on the overall economic activity. These 
macroeconomic conditions are the motivational background against which we 
attempt to analyze how the weak private consumption shown in Figure 2 may be 
related to the unprecedentedly high leverage of households.  
Turning to the economic recession in 2008-09, the unemployment rate increased 
and remained relatively high for a while even after the financial crisis, as shown in 
Figure 3.3 As the economy came out of the recession, the unemployment rate 
gradually declined in 2011-13 to pre-crisis levels. As a measure of uncertainty, we 
can also observe stock market volatility.4 Stock market volatility jumped to very 
high levels at the onset of the financial crisis and then declined moving out of the 
recession. In the face of the European fiscal crisis (2011-12), stock volatility 
jumped again but to a lesser extent than that during the global financial crisis 
(2008-09). It is important to note the greater magnitude of the degree of uncertainty 
and the sizes of shocks, which were greater during the global financial crisis than 
during the subsequent period of European turmoil. High uncertainty and 
pessimistic views about the future amid the worsening macroeconomic 
development may have affected the perceptions of indebted householders of their 
desired debt levels; hence, some of them may have adjusted their spending 
downward in a precautionary manner, contributing to the weakness of private 
consumption growth, as shown in Figure 2. We expect that high uncertainty and 
more pessimistic views of the economy likely exerted more downward pressure on  
 
3Hall (2012) pays particular attention to the level of unemployment as a major indicator of ‘the slump.’  
4Romer (1990) uses stock market variability as a measure of uncertainty to analyze its impact on the 
consumption contraction during the Great Depression in the US. We can also refer to Engle, Ghysels, and Sohn 
(2013); Hamilton and Lin (1996); and Schwert (1989), among others, who link stock market volatility to real 
economic activity. 
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FIGURE 4. HOME PRICE GROWTH: NOMINAL VS. REAL RATES 
Note: The grey line is the nominal annual% change and the black line is the real annual% change. 
Source: Housing Purchase Price Index from KB Kookmin Bank. 
  
consumer spending.  
Amid the recession during the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the housing 
market also experienced depressive pressure, as shown in Figure 4. As 
macroeconomic conditions worsened again in 2011-13, though not as dramatically 
as in the financial crisis period, the housing market also faced downward pressure, 
as shown in Figure 4. The depressive developments in the housing market likely 
eroded the net worth of homeowners while damaging the balance sheet positions of 
highly leveraged homeowners in particular. We expect that those indebted and with 
weak balance sheet positions adjusted their spending behavior in the face of the 
downward pressure in the housing market, as they were likely to face difficulties in 
accessing credit or may have found that their current debt levels were not desirable. 
It should also be noted that there have been depressive developments in the 
housing market both in 2007-09 and 2011-13, through the downward pressure was 
greater and lasted longer during the global financial crisis era of 2007-09.  
Along with the downward pressure in the housing market during the two periods 
(2007-09 and 2011-13), credit market conditions also turned unfavorable. A survey 
on lending practices suggested that households’ accessibility to credit worsened 
during the crisis period and during 2011-13, as shown in Figure 5. The tightened 
credit standards may have influenced the consumption smoothing behavior of 
households during this time, especially for highly leveraged households or those in 
the low-income brackets with liquidity constraints. We may note that the regulatory 
LTV (loan to value) ceiling of bank loans had been set at 60%, until it was raised to 
70% in August of 2014; hence, those high LTV borrowers may have had difficulty 
in accessing credit for additional loans. We expect that households’ spending 
behavior may have been affected by credit standards but at different degrees 
depending on their leverage ratios. 
We consider adverse macroeconomic conditions during the two periods of 2007-
09 and 2011-13 in the analysis of the relationship between ex-ante household 
leverage and subsequent consumption growth. As discussed above, the former 
period is a recession characterized by high uncertainty and bleak future prospects 
with the housing market under downward pressure and credit market conditions 
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FIGURE 5. SURVEY ON LENDING PRACTICES: LENDING ATTITUDE AND CREDIT RISKS 
Note: The grey lines are the four-quarter moving averages of each survey (in black lines). 
Source: Survey on Lending Practices from the Bank of Korea. 
 
tightened. The latter period also shows deceleration in economic activity overall 
but at less severe levels than in the former period. In short, the two periods (2007-
09 and 2011-13) are characterized by worsening economic conditions while the 
former period involved a more adverse shock. We expect that household 
indebtedness likely influenced consumer spending in these times of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions. Against this background, we investigate how ex-ante 
household leverage may be related to subsequent consumer spending. 
 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The current study uses the National Survey of Tax and Benefit (NaSTaB) as the 
household-level panel data set for the empirical analysis. The NaSTaB data set has 
been compiled and released annually since the first interview in 2008. This 
nationwide survey asks individuals and households about their economic activities 
and well-being mostly during the previous year in broad categories such as income, 
consumption, wealth, liabilities, taxes and benefits every year in an effort to 
understand the household sector. The data set involves 5,634 households which are 
surveyed yearly.5 The NaSTaB data used in the current empirical study contain 
rich information about consumption while covering the two periods of the 
recession of 2007-09 and the recent (2011-13) economic slow-down.  
In order to analyze how households’ financial positions are related to their 
consumption behaviors, we extract household-level information about their balance 
sheets and income-expenditure flows from the NaSTaB data set. Among the 
variables of interest, disposable income is calculated as the total sum of household 
income excluding non-consumption expenditures such as taxes and social security  
 
 
5As an alternative data set with detailed information about the financial conditions of households, we may 
consider the Survey of Household Finances (SHF). However, the SHF does not contain much information about 
the consumption side of households, while it started in 2010, a few years after the global financial crisis. 
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
(UNIT: 1,000KRW) 
Year 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Current Income 32,398 34,220 37,405 39,278 
Non-current Income 2,223 2,824 2,128 1,190 
Consumption expenditures 18,616 24,207 24,449 25,560 
Non-consumption expenditures 5,652 6,149 6,811 7,997 
Financial Asset 23,193 25,725 29,285 32,803 
Real Estate Asset 184,816 183,740 202,201 217,022 
Debt 34,198 34,649 39,382 40,396 
Net Worth 176,291 176,575 193,483 209,909 
Note: The numbers are average values in 1,000 KRW currency units. Among the variables, current income denotes 
regular sources of income covering labor income, asset income, net business income, social security income, 
transfer income, and other regular income. Non-current income is irregular or temporary sources of income such 
as inheritances and gifts. Adding all of the subcategories of current and non-current income gives the total 
household income. Non-consumption expenditures consist of income tax, property tax, pension payments, social 
security payments, transfer payments, and other similar payments. 
Source: National Survey of Tax and Benefit, Korea Institute of Public Finance. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT-TO-ASSET AND DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIOS IN 2007 
Note: The left and right panels show the distribution of the total debt to total asset ratios and the distribution of the 
total debt to disposable income ratios, respectively, for indebted households in 2007. 
 
payments.6 Consumption expenditures, total assets, and the total debt of each 
household are calculated as the total sums of all of their respective sub-categories. 
Net worth is the difference between total assets and total debts. Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics of several major variables of interest. As a measure of the 
leverage ratio for each household, we consider total debt (D)/total assets (A), net 
worth (NW)/total assets (A), and the total debt/disposable income ratio. We may 
note that the D/A and NW/A ratios contain essentially the same information as a 
measure of the balance sheet composition because  NW/A= A-D /A =1-D/A.   
The current study investigates how households’ balance sheet positions affect the 
behaviors of the households as consumers. In particular, we pay attention to the 
heterogeneity of household leverage as a possible determinant that affects 
consumption decisions. Below we show how households differ in terms of their 
 
6See the notes below Table 1 for detailed information about the income categories of the NaSTaB data set. 
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leverage ratios. We consider the total debt/total assets and total debt/disposable 
income ratios as measures of household leverage. Figure 6 shows the distribution 
of the debt-to-asset and debt-to-disposable income ratios for indebted households 
in 2007. In the figure, we find much heterogeneity in leverage ratios across 
indebted households. We also note that households are heterogeneous in terms of 
their net asset ratios because the net asset ratios contain essentially the same 
information about the balance sheet composition as the debt-to-asset ratios. In other 
words, the net worth buffers, working as cushions against potential financial 
distress, are different across households. Thus, the heterogeneity in leverage ratios 
may indicate different degrees of resilience across households against an adverse 
economic environment. We examine how the ex-ante heterogeneity in households’ 
leverage ratios is related to the subsequent consumption behavior of the household 
in the face of adverse economic conditions.  
 
V. Empirical Specifications 
 
In this section, we establish empirical specifications to analyze how household 
leverage may affect consumption behavior in the face of adverse economic 
environments. We are interested in the two periods of 2007-09 and 2011-13, during 
which macroeconomic conditions worsened but in different degrees, as discussed 
above. In the current study, we ask if households’ indebtedness contributed to the 
weakness in their consumption expenditures during the deep recession of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09 and during the decelerating macroeconomic conditions 
of 2011-13. From the perspective of business cycle research, this question asks 
whether households’ indebtedness or balance sheet positons can amplify the depth 
and/or duration of the downward pressure on aggregate economic activity. We 
often encounter such claims from news media and from policy circles, who state 
that unprecedentedly large amounts of debt can be blamed for the continuing 
weakness in private consumption since the global financial crisis, but without much 
empirical evidence. The current study aims to address this issue by providing 
evidence based on household data analysis.  
In order to address this issue, we set out a baseline regression specification 
which may explain how consumption growth is determined with household debt 
taken into account. Reflecting on previous arguments pertaining to wealth as a 
determinant of consumption, we take net worth as a major determinant of 
consumption in addition to income.7 In addition to the net worth component of the 
balance sheet, we ask how a balance sheet composition in terms of the leverage 
ratio can affect consumer spending. It is important to note that the net worth 
component itself does not tell us much about the composition or vulnerability of 
the balance sheet. In contrast, such leverage ratios as the debt-to-asset ratio (=D/A) 
or the net-worth-to-asset ratio (=NW/A) may measure the composition of the 
 
7As possible channels from wealth to consumption, such arguments as wealth effects, collateral constraints, 
common factors, and financial liberalization are discussed in the literature, although some of these arguments 
remain under debate (Browning, Gørtz, and Leth-Petersen 2013). See also Disney, Gathergood, and Henley 
(2010); Campbell and Coco (2007); and Iacoviello (2004), among others, for more discussions on the effects of 
wealth on consumption. 
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household balance sheet because the size of the balance sheet (asset; A) equals debt 
(D) plus the net worth (NW). To explain how vulnerability in the balance sheet 
composition may affect consumer spending, we incorporate the heterogeneity in 
household leverage ratios into the empirical specification as a potential factor that 
affects consumption behavior. In addition, we consider that debtors (borrowers) 
may show different consumption behaviors from non-debtors (savers) mainly due 
to their different preferences, as discussed by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and 
by King (1994), among others.  
Reflecting on the above discussions, we examine the following empirical 
specification as a baseline regression model in order to answer the questions at 
hand.  
The baseline regression specification is as follows:  
 
(1) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0
, 0 1 2 , , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 ,
 ( ) _
  
i t t i t i t i t t i t t
i t t i t i
C Lev D dum Y NW
HHsize X
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  
  

         
      
 
Here, 
0 1i,
C t t  is the change in the consumption expenditures of household i  in 
the period from 0t  to 1.t  0,i tLev  is the leverage ratio of household i  at 0t , the 
beginning of the period in which macroeconomic conditions worsened. 
0,
_ i tD dum  
is a dummy variable that represents the indebtedness of household i  at 0;t hence,  01 2 , * i tLev   can be interpreted as the difference in consumption growth 
rates between debtors and non-debtors while 
02 ,
* i tLev  can explain the 
difference between debtors with different leverage ratios. As a measure of 
0,
,i tLev  
we consider the debt/asset (D/A) or debt/income (D/Y) ratios. Note that the 
debt/asset ratio contains information identical to that associated with the net worth 
buffer (=net worth/asset), as discussed earlier. In the specification, 
0 1i,
,Y t t
0 1i,
NW ,t t  and 0 1,i t tHHsize   denote the change in disposable income, the net 
worth, and the family size of household i in the period from 0t  to 1,t  
respectively. 
0 1i,
Y t t  may be relevant to liquidity-constrained or myopic 
households whose consumption levels may be affected by their income changes. 
The household size  0 1,i t tHHsize   can explain the hump-shaped pattern of the 
lifetime consumption profile.8 
0i,
X t  is a vector of other variables at ݐ଴ that may 
influence subsequent consumption changes, such as household characteristics that 
may reflect consumer preferences - e.g. 
0i,
X t  may include educational attainment 
levels and demographic structures. For example, older householders in retirement 
may be more sensitive regarding their consumption in response to poor economic 
 
8See Attanasio et al. (1999) and Attanasio and Weber (1995), among others, about the relationships between 
changes in family compositions and consumption growth. 
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conditions with uncertainty and tight credit standards.  0 1andt t  represent (2007, 
2009) for the recession of the global financial crisis and (2011, 2013) for the recent 
economic slow-down, respectively. We also examine alternative specifications as 
variants of the baseline model (1) to address the relevant issues at hand. 
Note that C, Y, and NW in the above specification are ‘inverse hyperbolic   
sine’ transformed,9 respectively, as suggested by Dynan (2012). This type of 
transformation can incorporate such cases with zero or negative (-) variables while 
dealing with extreme values in micro-data sets. For example, there may be many 
households with a negative (-) ‘net worth’; hence, taking the logs of such variables 
may reduce the sample size while excluding the relevant households from the 
regression analysis. As noted by Dynan (2012), the interpretation of this type of 
transformation may be similar to that of a logarithmic transformation except for the 
very small values. For the use of and discussion about this transformation, see 
Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003); Dynan (2012); Browning et al. (2013); and 
Burbidge et al. (1988), among others. 
We consider differences in consumption types, income and net worth levels in 
the following analyses of consumer behavior in relation to leverage. Taking the 
differences in those categories into account may shed some light on the possible 
channels from household leverage to consumption behaviors while providing 
useful guidance for policy directions. For example, household expenditures can be 
divided into those for durable goods and non-durables because the demand for 
durables may be more sensitive to uncertainty and credit standards than that for 
non-durables. Hence, the responses pertaining to durables may be more dramatic in 
times of more adverse economic downturns. In addition, we divide households into 
low- and high-income (wealth) groups because low-income (wealth) families are 
likely to be liquidity-constrained, whereas high-income (wealth) families tend to be 
less liquidity-constrained with high saving rates. We compare low-income (wealth) 
households with high-income (wealth) groups to shed light on the role of 
uncertainty in comparison with credit standards.  
  
VI. Estimation Results and Discussions 
 
We examine below how households may have responded in terms of their 
consumption expenditure in relation to their leverage ratios during the global 
financial crisis (2007-09) as well as in the recent years of the decelerating 
macroeconomic conditions (2011-13). As measures of the leverage ratio, we 
consider the ratio of total debt to total assets (D/A) and total debt to disposable 
income (D/Y). The baseline specification (1) and its variant forms are estimated for 
each period as discussed above and the main results are reported in Table 2 ~ Table 
4. For the estimations, outliers in the leverage ratios are excluded from the sample.  
Table 2 shows the baseline regression results for each respective period: 2007-09 
vs. 2011-13. We find that indebtedness shows significant and negative effects on 
consumption expenditure growth, suggesting that the liability side of balance sheet  
 
9‘Inverse hyperbolic sign’ transformation of x = log(x+(x2+1)1/2) 
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TABLE 2—BASELINE REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION GROWTH 
 △Consumption in 2007-09 △Consumption in 2011-13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
D_duma -0.100**(0.025)   
-0.073**
(-0.029) 
-0.072**
(-0.028) 
-0.138**
(-0.024)   
-0.098**
-0.028 
-0.080**
-0.027 
D/Aa  -0.114**(0.032)     
-0.180**
(-0.034)    
D/Ya   -0.016**(0.004)     
-0.029**
(0.004)   
(D/A)*D_duma    -0.070**(0.036)     
-0.116**
(0.038)  
(D/Y)*D_duma     -0.011**(0.005)     
-0.022**
(0.005) 
△Income 0.136**(0.016) 
0.135**
(0.016) 
0.141**
(0.016) 
0.135**
(0.016) 
0.139**
(0.016) 
0.207**
(0.016) 
0.206**
(0.016) 
0.223**
(0.016) 
0.206**
(0.016) 
0.219**
(0.016) 
△Net Worth 0.007**(0.003) 
0.011**
(0.003) 
0.007**
(0.003) 
0.010**
(0.003) 
0.007**
(0.003) 
0.008**
(0.004) 
0.014**
(0.004) 
0.008**
(0.004) 
0.012**
(0.004) 
0.008**
(0.004) 
△Family Size 0.161**(0.022) 
0.161**
(0.022) 
0.162**
(0.022) 
0.160**
(0.022) 
0.161**
(0.022) 
0.175**
(0.019) 
0.176**
(0.019) 
0.177**
(0.019) 
0.174**
(0.019) 
0.175**
(0.019) 
(40s_50s)_duma 0.01 (0.032) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.007 
(0.032) 
0.014 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.033) 
-0.019 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.033) 
-0.009 
(0.033) 
0.003 
(0.033) 
(After_60)_duma -0.103**(0.041) 
-0.108**
(0.041) 
-0.085**
(0.041) 
-0.109**
(0.041) 
-0.095**
(0.041) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
-0.034 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.041) 
-0.032 
(0.041) 
-0.003 
(0.041) 
Educationa -0.011 (0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.01 
(0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.021**
(0.009) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
Const. 0.272**(0.054) 
0.271**
(0.054) 
0.240**
(0.053) 
0.283**
(0.054) 
0.264**
(0.054) 
0.127**
(0.056) 
0.128**
(0.056) 
0.088 
(0.055) 
0.140**
(0.056) 
0.109* 
(0.056) 
Adj. 2R   0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.077 0.076 0.079 0.079 0.081 
# Obs. 3,791 3,791 3,791 3,791 3,791 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05. a  indicates the beginning of each period: 2007 for the sample period of 2007-09 and 
2011 for the sample period of 2011-13. △Income, △Net Worth, △Family and Size are changes in income, net 
worth, and family size, respectively. D_dum is a dummy variable for debt holdings. D/A and D/Y are the debt-to-
asset and debt-to-income ratios, respectively. (40s_50s)_dum and (After_60)_dum are dummy variables denoting a 
householder aged 40-60 and after 60, respectively. 
 
 
vulnerability affects their consumption behavior. It should be noted that the impact 
of household indebtedness on consumption growth is stronger in 2011-13 ((1)~(5)) 
than in 2007-09 ((6)~(10)). That is, debtors adjusted their consumption growth 
down more conspicuously during the less adverse macroeconomic environment 
(2011-13) than during the recession (2007-09). This result suggests the possibility 
that household balance sheets were more vulnerable in the interim period (2007-11) 
such that borrowers showed more sensitive responses even against the less adverse 
economic conditions in the latter period.10 We find that all of the changes in 
disposable income, net worth, and family size have positive signs with high 
significance levels, as expected, consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
We also note that households with older householders above 60 years of age show 
lower levels of consumption growth compared to those in other age groups for 
2007-09, suggesting that older household heads behaved in a more precautionary 
manner under the mounting uncertainty associated with the global financial crisis 
of 2007-09.11 It is interesting to note that household heads with higher educational 
 
10Household debt increased by almost 40% from 2007 to 2011, largely led by loans from non-bank financial 
institutions. See Kim and Yoo (2013) and Kim and Byun (2012), among others, for detailed information about how 
household debt and its quality levels changed during the period.  
11The regression for the robustness check shows that consumption growth for older householders during 
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attainment have shown lower consumption growth in the face of the adverse 
economic conditions in both 2007-09 and 2011-13 periods. 
It is important to note that both the debt dummy  1  and the cross-product 
term between the debt dummy and the debt-to-asset ratio  2  are highly 
significant ((4), (5), (9), and (10)) such that omitting either of them can lead to 
biased estimates. In order to gain a sense of the size of the impact of indebtedness 
on consumption growth during 2007-09, we can examine the estimates of the debt 
dummy (-0.073) and the cross-product term between the debt dummy and the debt-
to-asset ratio (-0.07) in (4). If we considered a debtor with a 10% debt-to-asset ratio 
and a non-debtor, the difference in their nominal consumption growth rates with all 
else being equal would be -8%p/2yrs. (=-0.073-0.07*0.1), or -4%p/yr. On the other 
hand, if we considered the case between debtors with a 10%p difference in the 
debt-to-asset ratio, the difference in their nominal consumption growth rates would 
be -0.7%p/2yrs. (=-0.07*0.1), or -0.35%p/yr. Following the same procedures above 
and based on estimation results in (9) for the period of 2011-13, we note that the 
difference in the nominal consumption growth rates between the debtor with a 10% 
debt-to-asset ratio and the non-debtor would be -10.96%p/2yrs. (=-0.098-
0.116*0.1), or -5.48%p/yr. On the other hand, the difference in nominal 
consumption growth rates between debtors with a 10%p difference in the debt-to-
asset ratio would be -1.16%p/2yrs. (=-0.116*0.1), or -0.58%p/yr. in 2011-13. 
Hence, there appears to be a relatively large difference between debtors and non-
debtors in terms of their consumption behavior in the face of adverse economic 
conditions in comparison with the difference between debtors with different 
leverage ratios.  
We find from the above analyses that higher leverage ratios may exert greater 
downward pressure on the growth rates of consumption expenditures. Figure 7 
shows the heterogeneity in the household leverage ratios in terms of the debt-to-  
 
 
FIGURE 7. LEVERAGE RATIOS OF INDEBTED HOUSEHOLDS:  
DEBT/ASSET AND DEBT/INCOME RATIOS 
Note: The leverage ratios are divided into five quintiles from the bottom 20% to the top 20% (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4,  
and Q5).  
                                                                                                         
2011-13 would also be lower than that of other age groups if the possible previous consumption spikes were 
controlled for by including the lagged consumption growth in the regression specification. 
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TABLE 3—REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION GROWTH: DURABLES VS. NON-DURABLES 
 △Consumption in 2007-09  △Consumption in 2011-13 
 ( Durables ) ( Non-durables )  ( Durables ) ( Non-durables ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
D_duma -0.505** (0.121) 
-0.452** 
(0.121) 
0.041** 
(0.015) 
0.029*  
(0.015) 
-0.213** 
(0.072) 
-0.201** 
(0.072) 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.031** 
(0.014) 
(D/A)*D_duma -0.198 (0.151)  
-0.031 
(0.019)  
-0.232** 
(0.100)  
-0.038** 
(0.019)  
(D/Y)*D_duma  -0.050** (0.021)  
-0.000 
(0.003)  
-0.035** 
(0.013)  
-0.002 
(0.002) 
△Income 0.139** (0.066) 0.156** (0.066) 0.075** (0.008) 0.076** (0.009) 0.257** (0.043) 0.277** (0.043) 0.094** (0.008) 0.096** (0.008) 
△Net Worth 0.028** (0.013) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
△Family Size 0.229** (0.091) 
0.232** 
(0.091) 
0.185** 
(0.012) 
0.185** 
(0.012) 
0.305** 
(0.050) 
0.307** 
(0.050) 
0.194** 
(0.010) 
0.194** 
(0.010) 
(40s_50s)_duma 0.387** (0.133) 
0.415** 
(0.133) 
-0.046** 
(0.017) 
-0.044** 
(0.017) 
0.154* 
(0.088) 
0.175** 
(0.088) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
(After_60)_duma 0.315* (0.172) 
0.371** 
(0.172) 
-0.103** 
(0.022) 
-0.101** 
(0.022) 
-0.137 
(0.107) 
-0.085 
(0.107) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.02 
(0.020) 
Educationa 0.021 (0.038) 
0.029 
(0.038) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.034 
(0.024) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
Const. 3.236** (0.227) 
3.167** 
(0.226) 
0.190** 
(0.029) 
0.185** 
(0.029) 
0.304** 
(0.147) 
0.250* 
(0.146) 
0.063** 
(0.028) 
0.057** 
(0.028) 
Adj. 2R  0.012 0.013 0.101 0.100 0.029 0.029 0.148 0.147 
# Obs. 3,791 3,791 3,791 3,791 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05. a  indicates the beginning of each period: 2007 for the sample period of 2007-09 and 
2011 for the sample period of 2011-13. △Income, △Net Worth, △Family and Size are changes in income, net 
worth, and family size, respectively. D_dum is a dummy variable for debt holdings. D/A and D/Y are debt-to-asset 
and debt-to-income ratios, respectively. (40s_50s)_dum and (After_60)_dum are dummy variables denoting a 
householder aged 40-60 and after 60 respectively. 
 
asset ratio and the debt-to-income ratio. In particular, we find that debtors in the 
top quintile take very high leverage positions compared to those by other groups. 
This distributional feature suggests that the impact of the leverage ratio on 
household spending is heterogeneous, with its impacts more concentrated in highly 
leveraged households. We can compute the difference in the depressive effects of 
leverage ratios on consumption growth across different groups of leverage ratios. 
For example, the difference in the median debt/asset ratio between the fourth   
and the fifth quintile is approximately 0.48 for 2007, explaining approximately      
-3.36%p/2yrs. (=-0.07*0.48), or a -1.68%p/yr. difference between the two groups 
for nominal consumption growth during 2007-09. The difference in the median 
debt/asset ratio between the third and fourth quintile is close to 0.16 for 2007, 
explaining about -1.12%p/2yrs. (=-0.07*0.16), or a -0.56%p/yr. difference between 
the two groups in terms of nominal consumption growth for 2007-09. Thus, we 
note how the distributional feature of leverage ratios in the household sector would 
predict the distribution of consumption growth with all else being equal. 
Table 3 shows the regression results for consumer durables and non-durables in 
the two periods of 2007-09 and 2011-13. Household expenditures can be divided 
into durable goods and non-durables. The demand for consumer durables may be 
more sensitive to uncertainty and credit standards than that for non-durables; 
hence, the responses for durables may be more dramatic in times of more severe 
economic downturns. We find that indebted households cut back their demand for 
durables much more strongly than their demand for non-durables in the face of the  
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TABLE 4—REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION GROWTH:  
FOR INDEBTED HOUSEHOLDS WITH DIFFERENT INCOME AND NET WORTH LEVELS 
 △Consumption in 2007-09  △Consumption in 2011-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(D/A) a -0.169** (0.057) 
-0.139** 
(0.044)   
-0.179** 
(0.071) 
-0.189** 
(0.046)   
(D/A)*(50<Y<80)_duma 0.036 (0.079)    
-0.062 
(0.089)    
(D/A)*(Y>80)_duma -0.013 (0.095)    
0.010 
(0.104)    
(D/A)*(50<NW<80)_duma  -0.612** (0.152)    
-0.607** 
(0.147)   
(D/A)*(NW>80)_duma  -1.111** (0.243)    
-1.095** 
(0.218)   
(D/Y) a   -0.017* (0.009) 
-0.017** 
(0.007)   
-0.032** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
(D/Y)*(50<Y<80)_duma   -0.004 (0.012)    
-0.004 
(0.012)  
(D/Y)*(Y>80)_duma   -0.015 (0.013)    
0.001 
(0.011)  
(D/Y)*(50<NW<80)_duma    -0.012 (0.012)    
-0.059** 
(0.012) 
(D/Y)*(NW>80)_duma    -0.038** (0.017)    
-0.045** 
(0.018) 
Adj. 2R  0.040 0.056 0.042 0.044 0.064 0.081 0.071 0.082 
# Obs. 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,868 1,894 1,894 1,894 1,894 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, a  indicates the beginning of each period: 2007 for the sample period of 2007-09 and 
2011 for the sample period of 2011-13. All explanatory variables are not reported to save space. D/A and D/Y are 
debt-to-asset and debt-to-income ratios, respectively. (50<Y<80)_dum and (Y>80)_dum are dummy variables for 
households’ disposable income levels between 50-80% and above 80%, respectively. (50<NW<80)_dum and 
(NW>80)_dum are dummy variables for households’ net worth levels between 50-80% and above 80%, 
respectively. 
 
adverse economic environments, thus confirming the argument of Mishkin (1976) 
based on household-level analysis. In 2007-09, indebted households’ levels of 
demand for durables showed much lower growth rates than that for non-debtors 
((1) and (2)), while their expenditures for non-durables recorded somewhat higher 
growth rates than those of non-debtors ((3) and (4)). In 2011-13, debtors adjusted 
their expenditure growth down for both durables and non-durables, while their 
downward adjustments were much stronger for durables ((5) and (6)) than for non-
durables ((7) and (8)). The decline in consumption growth for non-durables in 
particular may reflect the fact that debtors’ perceptions of economic prospects may 
have been worse. Regarding the nominal growth in non-durable consumption in 
2011-13, the difference between a debtor with a 10% debt/asset ratio and non-
debtors would be -2.68%p/2yrs. (=-0.023-0.038*0.1), or -1.34%p/yr., while the 
difference between debtors with a 10%p difference in the debt/asset ratio would be 
-0.38%p/2yrs, or -0.19%p/yr. 
Table 4 shows the regression results for indebted households with different 
income and net worth levels. Household income is divided into three groups: below 
the median (<50%), 50-80%, and above 80%. Household net worth levels are also 
divided into three groups: below the median (<50%), 50-80%, and above 80%. 
Families with low income (wealth) levels are likely to be liquidity-constrained, 
whereas families with high income (wealth) levels tend to be not or less liquidity-
constrained with high saving rates. We compare low-income (wealth) indebted 
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households with high-income (wealth) groups to shed light on the roles of 
uncertainty and credit standards. The estimation results show that household 
leverages in all income (wealth) brackets exert significant downward pressure on 
consumption growth in both periods, while the effects are stronger in the high-
income (wealth) groups. This result suggests that uncertainty or pessimistic views 
of the future may have caused leveraged households to adjust their consumption 
growth down in a more precautionary manner. The depressive effects of the 
leverage ratios on consumption growth are weaker in the low-income (wealth) 
brackets because they may have already spent a large share of their income for 
consumption to maintain their minimal living standards, while those in the top 
income (wealth) brackets still had room to reduce their spending. Given that 
leverage ratios tend to be higher in low-income households, the adverse events for 
low-income debtors may have had somewhat sizable effects on their spending 
growth despite the fact that the depressive effects of leverage on consumption 
growth are less severe for low-income groups than for high-income groups. It 
should also be noted that the depressive effects of leverage on consumption growth 
were greater in 2011-2013 ((5)~(8)) than in 2009-11 ((1)~(4)) in all income 
(wealth) brackets. This result suggests that household leverage may have raised 
more concern about the real economy in more recent years.  
We also performed robustness-check regressions in the current study, though the 
estimation results are not reported here due to space constraints. We assessed how 
certain possible consumption spikes in previous years would affect the main results 
in the above analyses, finding that the regressions for the robustness check increase  
2R  significantly, while most of the main results of this paper remain effective.12 
In addition, we checked how debt accumulation for a temporarily large expenditure 
in the previous period would affect the estimated relationship between ex-ante 
leverage and ex-post consumption growth, finding that the regressions excluding 
those (potentially bias-generating) households from the sample still support the 
main results of the current study.13 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The findings of the current study show that the soundness of household balance 
sheets matter in the real economy even in cases in which financial markets and 
intermediaries continue to function without severe disruptions. In other words, 
liability-side vulnerability or the weak financial positions of households may put 
 
12For the robustness check, we controlled several possible spikes in consumption, such as auto purchases at 
the beginning year (ݐ଴) by including the lagged consumption growth in the regression specifications, as discussed 
by Andersen et al. (2014) and Son and Choi (2015). Among previous studies, Andersen et al. (2014) and Son and 
Choi (2015) considered the effects of such possible consumption spikes on the subsequent consumption growth, 
whereas Dynan (2012) did not take such effects into account in her analyses.  
13Households that increased their debt for temporarily large expenditures (such as medical expenditures or 
auto purchases) in the previous period may contribute to some bias to the estimated relationship between ex-ante 
leverage and ex-post consumption growth. In order to deal with this issue, we undertook robustness-check 
regressions while excluding from the sample the (potentially bias-generating) households that spent more than 
their available income and increased their debt during the previous period. We find that the main arguments of the 
current study remain effective even after controlling for this type of potential bias. 
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downward pressure on private consumption even when the economy does not 
undergo a dramatically deep downturn. It should be noted that the depressive 
effects of households’ obligations on consumer spending may be heterogeneous, 
while they are more concentrated for highly leveraged groups than they are for 
others. That is, consumption expenditures of highly leveraged households may be 
more vulnerable to shocks than those of low-leveraged households or non-debtors. 
We find that adjustments in consumer spending by debtors were stronger for 
durable goods than for non-durables. In addition, we find that debtors in high-
income (wealth) groups showed even stronger adjustments in their consumption 
expenditures than did low-income (wealth) groups. These findings suggest that 
leveraged households may have behaved in a more precautionary manner in the 
face of uncertainty or pessimistic economic prospects, hence contributing to weak 
consumption growth. The above findings suggest that keeping household balance 
sheets sound may be important for the resilience of the real economy. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss several policy issues with respect to the 
depressive effects of liability-side household vulnerability on consumption. In 
order to keep the economy resilient, the weakening demand from leveraged 
households should be offset by rising levels of demand from other sectors of the 
economy. However, friction existing in many areas of the economy may prevent 
the reallocation of resources from one sector to another, aggravating the downward 
pressure on aggregate demand levels and on the overall economic activity, as 
indicated by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Hall (2011) and by Midrigan and 
Philippon (2011), among others. Thus, there may be room for policies to cushion 
the weakness on the demand side by relieving households’ debt burdens or by 
creating some demand.  
Policies to improve balance sheets may contribute to the recovery of the 
household sector, as balance sheet deterioration due to excessive debt accumulation 
may depress consumer spending. In the face of a debt-driven slow-down, monetary 
policies which raise inflation expectations may contribute to reducing real debt 
burdens (Svensson 2012). However, the central bank’s credibility may be a factor 
affecting inflation expectations; it can be argued that central banks may have 
difficulty in raising inflation expectations owing to their apparent commitment to 
prevent it (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). Hence, it is often argued that fiscal 
policies may play a more effective role in getting the economy out of a debt-driven 
slow-down if vulnerable balance sheets can be repaired in a relatively short period 
of time without damaging fiscal consolidation (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). 
However, it should be noted that there still appears to be unsettled debate regarding 
the effectiveness of fiscal policies.   
Monetary and financial policies in the past and in the present can affect the cost 
and availability of credit such that households may be incentivized to accumulate 
large amounts of household debt. If household balance sheets deteriorate, they 
would depress future consumer expenditures, such as those on durable goods, and 
house purchases in particular, because leveraged households may fear or are more 
likely to experience financial distress, as argued by Mishkin (1976, 1977, 1978). In 
this respect, there may be an emerging role for macro-prudential policies that 
attempt to prevent rapid credit expansions or too much leverage in order to keep 
households’ balance sheets sound, for example.  
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From an institutional perspective over a much longer time horizon, we can 
examine institutional arrangements that may affect the cost and availability of 
credit, as misaligned incentives may weaken the financial positions of households 
as well as financial institutions. In other words, current institutional arrangements 
may need to be under scrutiny regarding their appropriateness in relation to their 
overall economic performance. For example, the cost of defaults may be strongly 
associated with households’ consumption behaviors, especially in times of rising 
uncertainty followed by pessimistic views of the future economy, as argued by 
Olney (1999). 
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